

## ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ AND PLATO'S CAVE

SINCE the publication of Mr. J. E. Raven's 'Sun, Divided Line, and Cave' in this journal,<sup>1</sup> we have enjoyed the benefit of Professor J. Ferguson's rejoinder,<sup>2</sup> and of Mr. Raven's fuller statement of his views in his recent book *Plato's Thought in the Making*.<sup>3</sup> Now we also have to consider Mr. Neil Cooper's valuable suggestions about 'Διάνοια in Plato's Theory of Forms', which were published in 1966.<sup>4</sup>

### I. THE FORMS AND THE DIVIDED LINE

In Part I of his paper Cooper gives indisputable evidence regarding Plato's use of the man-made image as a step to the apprehension of a Form under discussion, whether that image be in fact a diagram or a model, or simply a verbal picture, such as his imaginative account of Justice within a community, which we find used to provide us with εἰδωλὸν τι τῆς δικαιοσύνης in *Republic* 443 c 4 ff.<sup>5</sup> However, Cooper goes on to assure us that the divided-line figure offers us only *three* types of object: 'We have three kinds of objects which differ from one another in clearness and esteem, firstly, the Forms, secondly, the objects of ordinary sense-perception, and thirdly, images, shadows and reflections.'<sup>6</sup> Now the admitted fact that, as he notes, *Republic* 10 (597 b 5-e 5) gives the same three orders of reality, does not entirely absolve Cooper from all the implications of Plato's decision to divide his line into *four* parts rather than *three*; for it is made quite clear in 509 b 6-10 that τὸ ἀγαθόν, the Form of the Good, is the source of *being* as well as of *knowledge*, so the Line must also classify both.

Furthermore, granting Cooper's assumption that the Line is concerned with orders of reality, should the reflections in the lowest segment be considered *objects* in the same sense in which physical objects of perception and perhaps Forms can claim so to be regarded? Moreover, if indeed reflections are to be regarded as visible objects as much as the physical objects of perception which they represent, why cannot the hypotheses of the lower segment of the upper section of the Line likewise be regarded just as much as *intelligible objects* in the same sense as the Forms which they represent?

Now it will not do to claim that such hypotheses are any less objective than the shadows and reflections of the bottom segment. A careful examination of 510 b 2-d 2 will serve to establish this point. However, to avoid the suggestion of special pleading, we shall not make a new translation but avail ourselves of the version published by the late Lord Lindsay of Birker:

—'Then consider further how the intelligible segment must be divided.'

—'How?'

—'Thus. In the one subdivision the soul is forced to conduct her search from *hypotheses*, using as images the things which were in the first segment the objects of imitation, proceeding not to a beginning but to an end, while in

<sup>1</sup> CQ N.S. iii (1953), 22-32.

<sup>2</sup> CQ N.S. xiii (1963), 188-93.

<sup>3</sup> C.U.P., 1965.

<sup>4</sup> CQ N.S. xvi (1966), 65-9.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. 67.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. 67.


the other, that which leads to a beginning that has no hypothesis, she starts from a hypothesis, without using the images used in the first, and conducts her inquiry simply and solely by the Forms themselves.'

—'I have not quite understood what you say', he said.

—'Then have it again,' I said. 'You will understand the more easily for what has been already said. I fancy that you know that those who study geometry and calculation and similar subjects, take as hypotheses the odd and the even, and figures, and three kinds of angles, and other similar things in each different inquiry. They make them into hypotheses *as though they knew them*, and will give no further account of them either to themselves or to others, on the ground that they are *plain to everyone*. Starting from these, they go on till they arrive by agreement at the original object of their inquiry.'<sup>1</sup>

In the light of this passage it becomes difficult not to take a hypothesis as the intellectual equivalent of the visible reflection. When we see a *reflection* in a mirror we react as though we see the *object* reflected: when we know a *hypothesis* we react as if we knew the *Form* it represents. So, if Cooper will accept shadows in his classes of objects, it seems he should consider accepting hypotheses as well.

Let us now consider the Line as a whole, and, as Nettleship and Raven recommend, vertically.<sup>2</sup>



Now the text of 509 d 6–8 puts it beyond reasonable doubt that Plato assumed the ratios  $A+B:C+D::A:B::C:D$ . Surely then on this view B's relation to A must be identical with D's relation to C? Now we recall that  $A+B$  represents the realm of intellect ruled over and enlightened by the Form of the Good, while  $C+D$  represents the solar realm ruled over and enlightened by the Sun. In D then we have sunlight-made images of the objects in C: so in B we must have intellect-made images of the Forms in A. On this view it is difficult to see why the *ὑποθέσεις* of B should not be just as objective *εἰκόνες* as the *σκιαί* of D. If the fact that we can make *μιμήσεις* with a mirror<sup>3</sup> does not prevent similar *φαντάσματα* from appearing when objects are naturally reflected in water, why then should the fact that we can deliberately make *εἰδωλόν τι* of any Form<sup>4</sup> *ἐν*

<sup>1</sup> A. D. Lindsay, *The Republic of Plato* (Dent [Everyman], 1935), 204–5.

<sup>2</sup> R. L. Nettleship, *Lectures on the Republic of Plato* (Macmillan), 238; cf. J. E. Raven,

*Plato's Thought in the Making* (C.U.P. 1965), 145.

<sup>3</sup> *Rep.* 10. 596 b 6–c 4.

<sup>4</sup> *Rep.* 4. 443 c 4–444 b 8.

λόγοις prevent its spontaneously formed εἰκὼν ὑποθετική from being perceptible to the mind as well?

But though it is difficult to acquiesce in Cooper's method of substituting a tripartite Divided Line for Plato's quadripartite one,<sup>1</sup> none the less one must agree that Cooper has done Platonic exegesis a great service by pointing out the intellectual parallel with the use of the κάτοπτρον in the solar realm—namely εἰδωλὸν τι ἐν λόγοις.<sup>2</sup> However, because not all our Forms are represented by intangibles in this world of sense, it follows that this εἰδωλον expressed in the account of justice at work in the model city of Republic 4 is not the only possible εἰδωλον: some such may be—as Mr. Cooper notices—tangible εἰδωλα, like a model sphere or cone. For, though it is tangible, a model sphere is not an object of nature like the equally tangible apple or orange. Nor, though both are artefacts, is it an object of the same order as a squash ball; for they differ in purpose. The model sphere is made to approximate to a hypothetical perfect shape unattainable with tools and material: the squash ball is made for practical use in our world of sense. It is true that one may use an orange or a squash ball as a model or εἰδωλον when discussing a perfect sphere, but for the purpose of the discussion they are regarded as model shapes, not as an orange or a squash ball. In terms of Plato's *Phaedrus*, they are approximate expressions of the memory of the Perfect Sphere.

Why *memory*? Because, as Raven very properly reminds us, the *Phaedrus* is very near to the *Republic* in spirit and probably was immediately subsequent in composition.<sup>3</sup> A passage from this dialogue does much to clarify the role of Recollection, or ἀνάμνησις. This explanation occurs in 246 d 6–249 d 2, where we find a description of the cyclic procession round the heavens by the twelve Gods, each escorted by the souls which belong to the train of that deity. We read: 'But of the regions above the heaven no poet here on earth has ever adequately sung the praise, or ever will.'<sup>4</sup> Again, a little later we find: 'Inasmuch then as a God's διάνοια is nourished by intellect (νῶ) and likewise is that of every soul such as is likely to receive the befitting thing, it rejoices at having seen Reality from time to time, and beholding Truth is nourished and fares well until the turning with the circle bears it round again to the same place. And on its way round it beholds Justice, it beholds Prudence, it beholds Understanding—not the kind to which Becoming is added, nor such as is perhaps different in different men and concerns those things which we here and now call realities.'<sup>5</sup> However, we ordinary men, as Plato explains, cannot control the ill-assorted horses of our souls' chariots. Thus we see only a little of the great verities, but we have not missed Reality entirely: 'For the soul which has never seen the Truth enters not into this human shape. A man must understand things according to their type, going from many perceptions to the unity brought together through reasoning. And this act is the ἀνάμνησις of those things which once a man's soul saw whilst faring with its God, looking down on those things we now say exist, and upwards towards what really is.'<sup>6</sup> For Plato all mental perception is expressed in visual terms.

Thus to Plato all men are by nature rational beings, because they have at least a little power to *recollect* this heavenly vision. This power enables them to generalize and think as human persons—in Vlastos's phrase, 'recollection'

<sup>1</sup> Cooper, op. cit., diagram, p. 69.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. 66.

<sup>3</sup> J. E. Raven, op. cit. 188–90.

<sup>4</sup> *Phaedrus* 247 c 3–4.

<sup>5</sup> *Phaedrus* 247 d 1–e 2.

<sup>6</sup> *Phaedrus* 249 b 5–c 4.

covers 'any enlargement of knowledge which results from the perception of logical relationships'. No device to illustrate this power of recollection was more valued by Platonists than the art of mathematical demonstration. This the earlier Socratic dialogue *Meno* shows clearly.<sup>1</sup> At 81 e 3 Meno remarks: 'Yes, Socrates, but what do you mean by saying we do not learn, but that what we call *learning* (μάθησις) is really *recollection* (ἀνάμνησις)?' Hereupon a full demonstration is made, using a slave boy untutored in mathematics, who is induced to discover that he already knew that the diagonal of a square on one unit is the square root of two. So it is with ἀνάμνησις that Plato appears to associate διάνοια most closely. One may agree with Cooper that διάνοια is 'making use of the objects of a lower class';<sup>2</sup> but only because ἀνάμνησις is apt either to recognize them as offering a significant approach towards a particular Form, or to induce us to manufacture them as approximations to that Form. Thus from the standpoint of the psychology of the *Phaedrus* and the epistemology of the *Meno* we may venture to suggest that the ὑποθέσεις of Segment B in the Divided Line of *Republic* 6 are to be defined as *mental images implanted in the memory*. Therefore we shall label them εἰκόνες ὑποθετικάι in our diagram in this paper. Again, the *recollection* (ἀνάμνησις) of these mental images is stimulated by the perception of similar objects occurring in the world of sense or 'solar realm'. Further, this recollection is to be clarified by the application of διάνοια either to εἰδωλόν τι ἐν λόγοις or to an actual diagram or model prepared for the purpose.

We may now redraw and expand our Divided Line thus:

Faculty	Segment	Contents	Mental Process of Perceiving the Good
INTELLECT	A	FORMS εἶδη	UNDERSTANDING ἐπιστήμη
	B	MEMORY IMAGES εἰκόνες ὑποθετικάι	THEORY διάνοια
SIGHT	C	OBJECTS AND CREATURES ζῷα	BELIEF πίστις
	D	MIRROR IMAGES σκιαί	CONJECTURE εἰκασία

It will be evident that this scheme does not offer a comprehensive epistemology, but simply a measure of the value of different types of perception as ways of apprehending the Good. However, this distinction is more apparent than real, as any reader of Nettleship's *Lecture on The Good as the Supreme Object of Knowledge* will appreciate. For as Nettleship wisely observes: 'It is essential to the understanding not only of Plato but of Greek philosophy generally, both

<sup>1</sup> J. E. Raven, op. cit. 42-4, 71-5, suggests dating *Meno* to 387 B.C. On the interpretation, see G. Vlastos, 'Anamnesis in the *Meno*',

*Dialogue* iv (1965), pp. 143-67.

<sup>2</sup> N. Cooper, op. cit. 67.

moral philosophy and the philosophy of knowledge, to realize the place held in them by the conception of the 'good' . . . The *good* is at once: first, the *end* of life, that is, the supreme object of all desire and aspiration; secondly, the condition of *knowledge*, or that which makes the world intelligible and the human mind intelligent; thirdly the creative and sustaining *cause* of the world.<sup>1</sup> Thus the apprehension of the Good is our basis of all knowledge, our attunement with the creative power, and our harmonizing of our purposes with the providential ends of living. When we discern any object of sense, and accept it without question—that is *πίστις*. When we see a shadow or reflection we infer some object which might be causing it—that is *εἰκασία*. When our minds perceive a Form we accept it with entire comprehension—that is *ἐπιστήμη*. Finally when our recollection recalls a memory image we set about deducing the Form which caused the image—that is the process called *διάνοια*. The exclusive concentration on epistemology in Cooper's whole approach does shed light on some important matters, but it most unfortunately also leads him to postulate a non-Platonic faculty called 'shadow-belief' and to ignore Plato's belief in the reality of the *memory images* recollected by *ἀνάμνησις*.<sup>2</sup>

## II. THE CAVE, THE LINE, AND EDUCATION

At *Republic* 514 a 1 Plato makes Socrates introduce the Cave as 'an illustration of our human nature in reference to *education and want of education*'. He tells us that the men chained in the Cave can see nothing but the shadows on the rock face in front of them which are cast by puppets being moved along the top of a low wall behind the prisoners, beyond which a fire is burning. Likewise they can hear no sound save the echo of voices uttered by the puppet operators behind this wall. Such prisoners are said to be *ὁμοίους ἡμῖν* in being able to see only shadows of themselves and shadows of the phenomena. Yet, if someone were to turn such a prisoner round bodily and oblige him to look at the fire and the objects on the wall and compel him to recognize these things from their familiar shadows, the prisoner would still consider those shadows seen earlier to be truer than the objects now shown him.

In 516 a-d it is also suggested that such a prisoner would resent being released and dragged up into the daylight outside the cave where he had always been kept, and that he would temporarily be blinded by the unfamiliar light. But later his eyes will perceive shadows and reflections by day and the stars and moon by night. Then finally he will look up at the sun, and recognize it as the source of light causing the seasons and all the other phenomena he observes. Consequently our liberated prisoner will pity the ignorance of his former comrades in the Cave and be anxious to enlighten them. But if he came down again to instruct them they would laugh at him; and they would kill him if he persisted in trying to drag them up to the light.

In his otherwise valuable discussion of this section, Raven seems unwise in neglecting *παιδείας τε περὶ καὶ ἀπαιδευσίας*, which should be taken closely with the *ὁμοίους ἡμῖν* which he so rightly emphasizes.<sup>3</sup> So, although he properly adheres to the traditional view (as indeed does Cooper) that the Divided Line

<sup>1</sup> Nettleship, op. cit. 218.

<sup>2</sup> Cooper, op. cit. 68.

<sup>3</sup> J. E. Raven, 'Sun, Divided Line, and Cave', *CQ* n.s. iii (1953), 27.

and Cave are parallel in their methods and contents<sup>1</sup>—a position securely based on Plato's own statement at 517 a 8–c 5—, yet he overlooks what seems the vital difference in purpose between these two symbols. For whilst the Divided Line is directed towards defining the limits of the various human faculties for comprehending the Good, the Cave is also devoted—in some of its aspects—rather to criticizing that contemporary mode of education in Greece and Sicily which seemed to Plato to be the main impediment to the apprehension of the Good.<sup>2</sup> Of course it still remains true, in Raven's expressive phrase, that its aim is also 'to paint, from a different angle from that of the *Symposium*, an imaginative and all-embracing picture of the pilgrimage of man'.<sup>3</sup>

It is true that some passages suggest that the Cave refers to our ordinary human life as a whole. So in 517 d 4–e 2 Socrates speaks of τὰ ἀνθρώπεια and τῷ παρόντι σκότῳ in terms implying this, while the same impression is sustained by 520 c 1–3: καταβατέον . . . εἰς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων συνοίκησιν καὶ συνεθιστέον τὰ σκοτεινὰ θεάσασθαι. But in both these cases the men now in the Cave seem free to look at the objects on the low wall as well as their shadows cast by the fire. So in 517 d 6–e 2 Socrates speaks of contests in the courts 'about shadows of justice or the images (of the just) from which these shadows are formed'. Again, in 520 c 1–6 it is made clear that the philosophically trained Guardians who return to govern in the Cave will see what each image is and what it represents far better than the normal inhabitants of the Cave can discern their nature, the reason being that the trained philosophers have seen the true originals of things in the upper region of the open air. So we grant that both these instances confirm that the *ordinary* residents of the Cave are able to behold the objects or 'images' as well as their shadows cast by the fire, and are thus unlike the prisoners first described. Finally, if any suspicion still remains that these prisoners are the sole inhabitants of the Cave, we should recall the mention of παρὰ τοῦτο τὸ τεῖχίον φέροντας ἀνθρώπους at 514 b 8, and remember that these same prisoners hear<sup>4</sup> voices ὅποτε τις τῶν παριόντων φθέγγετο. So, though the Cave may represent normal non-philosophical human life in 517 a 8–521 b 11, in the section from 514 a 1–517 a 7 it represents a more restricted situation. Further, from the introductory sentences 514 a 1–2 it is evident that this reference to the treatment of these prisoners must apply to the contemporary methods of Greek education.

Now in Plato's day the current basis of ancient Greek education was Music and Gymnastic. Gymnastic was primarily for the body, but Music was said to develop the soul.<sup>5</sup> Theoretically, musical education in Athens referred to the whole domain of the Muses, but in practice it consisted mainly of memorizing epic poetry with comments and learning how to play the harp or the lyre.

The attitude of Plato to such subjects of study is clear from other passages in the *Republic*, and it is no favourable one. In Book 10, at 596 d 2–e 3, Homer is dismissed as a creator of mere imitations of outward semblances, to be compared with a person going about with a mirror 'creating' outward images of things by reflecting them in his glass. To pay due tribute to Mr. Cooper's

<sup>1</sup> J. E. Raven, 'Sun, Divided Line, and Cave', *CQ*, n.s. iii (1953), 28.

<sup>2</sup> Nettleship stressed the educational element, though he saw the cave as an illustration of the native folly of humanity rather than as the fruit of a perverse educa-

tional tradition (pp. 259–61).

<sup>3</sup> J. E. Raven, *op. cit.* 166–7.

<sup>4</sup> *Republic* 515 b 8.

<sup>5</sup> R. L. Nettleship, *Lectures on Plato's Republic*, 78.

perspicacious use of the phrase,<sup>1</sup> the poet makes εἰδωλὸν τι ἐν λόγοις: but while the philosopher in such case bases his εἰδωλὸν upon τὸ εἶδος, the poet bases his upon τὰ ζῶα. Such reflections, whether in nature or ἐν λόγοις, are of course the less real class of discernible objects to be found in D, the lowest segment of the Line. They provide the material from which the mental process of εἰκασία or *conjecture* can make inferences regarding the objects, persons, and events to be found in the world of sense around us, but this faculty can make only the merest guesses about the nature of the Good. Then in 600 e 4-6 Plato again makes Socrates observe that all poets from Homer down are mere imitators of the outward shapes or images of the virtues or other qualities they describe. In other words, he holds that they are creators of *reflections* or *shadows*, the material of segment D at the bottom of our Divided Line. Therefore those compelled to study the shadows cast by the puppets in the Cave were in no worse case than the thousands of contemporary Greek youths who were compelled to study the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, for to Plato's mind the substance of these two epics was just as much the mere shadows of outward appearances as were those sights seen by the captives in the Cave.

However, Greek 'musical' education was not exclusively of this 'poetic' kind, a fact which accounts for the sudden appearance of the echo in the figure of the Cave, an element which was, as Raven rightly observes, 'conspicuous by its absence from the Line'.<sup>2</sup> If our application of the Cave symbol to current Greek 'musical' education is correct, then the introduction of the echo will now present no problem, for it will refer to the music of the harp or lyre which was also studied by Greek boys.<sup>3</sup> In 531 b 2-c 5 we find Socrates observing that the 'true' music which can rightly be considered a topic for διάνοια or *theory* is a study of abstract mathematical intervals and harmonies, not the practice of actual instrumental sounds and the concord of instrument with voice, nor the study of any such sounds. These latter disciplines would be classified as skills won by observation and usage, and they would thus belong to the sphere of πίστις or *belief*. Thus *true* music in the Platonic sense is connected with segment B of the Line, but music as the art currently practised by *virtuosi* in the concert hall belongs to the segment C. What then of the activities of the learner? Surely the imitative practice of their masters' techniques by the pupils of these expert performers of our audible music belonging to the segment C should now be assigned to the segment D? This is reasonable, because such music lessons and practice periods are attempts to train pupils to reproduce apparent harmonies audible to their ears just as echoes would reproduce such harmonies. Thus a boy trying to reproduce musical phrases, copied from his master's playing, will be concentrating on shadows belonging to the realm of *conjecture* or εἰκασία just as much as a boy reciting his Homer out loud will be doing.<sup>4</sup> But Plato wishes to emphasize that the sense of *hearing* is vital for learning music in the same degree as *sight* is essential for reading poetry: therefore the learning of a musical instrument as part of one's education is symbolized by the study of the *echoes* in the Cave. Indeed, once our educational interpretation of the Cave figure is adopted, the appearance of 'speculation and conjecture on the part of the prisoners about the significance of shadows and echo alike',<sup>5</sup> to

<sup>1</sup> CQ N.S. xvi (1966), 66.

<sup>2</sup> CQ, N.S. iii (1953), 28.

<sup>3</sup> F. A. G. Beck, *Greek Education, 450-350 B.C.* (Methuen, 1964), 80-3.

<sup>4</sup> For this classroom practice, see Plato, *Protagoras*, 325 e.

<sup>5</sup> CQ, N.S. iii (1953), 28.

which Raven prudently draws our attention, will likewise become wholly natural. For the captive victims of 'education' are kept constrained in a posture where they can be offered merely the contents of segment D—material for nothing more than *εἰκασία* about true and ultimate reality.

So though it may be right to object, as Raven does, that 'to say that any man sees shadows and reflections of objects without ever seeing the objects themselves is clearly absurd',<sup>1</sup> this is not in fact what has been said, if this educational interpretation once be accepted. All that this interpretation draws from the figure of the prisoners in the Cave is that Athenian education, viewed in Platonic terms, served only to feed children's minds on shadows, reflections, and echoes; and the use of the phrase *ἐκ παίδων*<sup>2</sup> adds a further corroboration to our view that it is *education* which here is under discussion. The effectiveness of this education and the difficulty in dispelling its impressions is then shown when the liberated prisoner still prefers the familiar shadows to the objects ranged before the fire in 515 d 5–7. It is again more strikingly admitted by Socrates himself, when at 595 b 9–10 he confesses to a reluctance to criticize Homer's poetry because of the reverence for it which he had gained in his youth. Plato had indeed himself seen quite tangible evidence in the execution of Socrates and in his own more recent experience in Syracuse to confirm the view that the captives in the Cave were always extremely hostile to any who would enlighten them by disabusing them of the delusions imparted by their Homeric education.

The subsequent account of the experience of the captive who is taken up to the daylight is no doubt partly intended to prepare the reader for that ideal scheme of education for the Guardians which is to follow this section. The prisoner's initial experience in being turned to face the fire and the objects on the wall represents the study and observation of actual things in nature: hence it would be an education appropriate to segment C of the Line as described in 510 a 5–6. Then, upon reaching the open air above, his first activity in the realm of intelligence is looking *down* at *reflections* in pools, as we are informed in 516 a 7. There may be here some hint of the water of Lethe, which, if drunk in due moderation, left a considerable impression of the visions beheld by a thus temperate soul in the heavenly pilgrimage of the *Phaedrus*.<sup>3</sup> However, there is an obvious analogy with visible segment D, thus implying that we have here its intellectual equivalent, which should be segment B, if the rules of proportion have any meaning. Certainly this looking at reflections is a training suited to segment B, and, on the analogy of the *Meno*,<sup>4</sup> likely to stimulate *ἀνάμνησις*, for it was explained in 511 a 3–b 2 that this is the mental process used in geometry.<sup>5</sup> Finally, in 516 b 4–c 2 looking *up* to the Sun and the consequent recognition of it as the first cause of all Being is clearly the discovery of the Form of the Good and its appropriate application to the understanding of the other Forms in the light of their Cause by that process of *dialectic* associated with segment A which is outlined in 511 b 3–c 7.

It will hardly surprise us then to find the ideal educational curriculum for the Guardians also proceeding upwards through the phenomena and mental processes of segments D, C, and B till it at last attains to segment A, and moreover using in this programme material carefully chosen to stimulate such

<sup>1</sup> *CQ*, n.s. iii (1953), 27.

<sup>2</sup> 514 a 5.

<sup>3</sup> *Phaedrus* 621 a 8–9.

<sup>4</sup> *Meno* 81 c 5–86 b 5.

<sup>5</sup> See also p. 82 above.



apprehension of the Good as is possible at each level. So, first in reference to the segment D, it is explained at 522 a 3-b 1 that the well-chosen 'musical' education based on 'improving' literature, which was earlier given mention in 377 b 11-392 c 4 as the foundation of public education, will give a well-adjusted disposition, but not *knowledge* (ἐπιστήμη). So in 522 c 1-524 d 6 Socrates turns to segment C, pointing out that—provided the material be well-chosen—counting, measuring, and weighing can arouse διάνοια and stimulate it to question and explain the findings of sense, no doubt arousing *recollection* or ἀνάμνησις in the process. In 527 a 1-531 d 4 it is explained that geometry, dynamics, and theory of music are concerned with the reflections of eternal Being, and thus can exercise διάνοια whilst leading the mind on towards Dialectic. Here we note the double status of the objects of segment B, comprising on the one hand memory images of the Forms, and on the other hand objects of nature or models—physical, diagrammatic, or verbal—which serve to refresh them. Finally, in 532 a 1-d 1 Socrates reiterates that Sight in the visible sphere corresponds to Dialectic in the intelligible sphere.

Thus the turning of our prisoner to behold the objects on the wall and then the firelight, his ascent to the sunlight and study of the reflections of eternal things in water are symbols for the pursuit of the studies just outlined. So mensuration and arithmetic in segment C turn his soul towards the firelight and the objects; while to study the geometry, musical theory, and celestial dynamics of segment B he must go up—out into the open air and sunlight—in his quest for the reflections they offer of eternal reality.

We may conclude this study of the Cave in relation to Greek education and Platonic educational ideals with a diagram, giving its full relation with the symbol of the Divided Line.


THE DIVIDED LINE			THE CAVE		
Faculty	Segment	Contents	Mental Process	Activity	Situation
INTELLECT	A	FORMS εἶδη	UNDER- STANDING ἐπιστήμη	Looking up at the stars and finally at the Sun itself	OPEN AIR
	B	MEMORY IMAGES εἰκόνες	THEORY διάνοια	Looking down at reflections of the sky and at objects	
SIGHT	C	OBJECTS AND CREATURES ζῶα	BELIEF πίστις	Looking at images of objects on the wall and at the fire	IN THE CAVE
	D	MIRROR IMAGES σκιαί	CONJECTURE εἰκασία	Looking at shadows and hearing echoes	

### III. CONCLUSION

Though the Divided Line is certainly in part a classification of the knowledge-value of classes of ocular and mental perception, and granting that the Cave in

some of its aspects offers a scheme of reform for Greek education, it is none the less true that the objective of the Sun-Divided Line-Cave sequence could equally well be regarded in our terms as *theological* rather than *epistemological*. The Form of the Good, as Nettleship long since reminded us, is at once the first cause, the sole source of perception of all other realities, and the goal and purpose of life.<sup>1</sup> Thus the Good stands very close to the God of Aquinas, as Tanqueray expounds the Thomist concept.<sup>2</sup> Whatever else the Good may signify to Platonists, it is certainly as much Plato's substitute for Zeus as the fulcrum of his ontology. Further, the contexts examined show that it is to be sought by Platonists with a fervour approaching religious devotion.

With this qualification, we may perhaps venture to recast Mr. Cooper's diagram of Plato's epistemology, renaming it as *Plato's Modes of apprehending the First Cause*. It should be noted that in our present diagram the meaning of the symbols used is also modified.  $X \cdots \cdots Y$  signifies 'in regard to the Good,  $X$  provides material for  $Y$ ', whilst  $\overset{C}{A} \rightleftarrows B$  signifies ' $A$  suggests  $C$  by process of  $B$ '.



## APPENDIX ON ΔΟΞΑ

At a first glance the postulating of  $\delta\acute{o}\xi\alpha$  as the process leading men's minds from shadows and reflections to the objects of sense may appear startling. The justification is to be drawn from *Republic*, 5. 479 e. This may be rendered thus: 'Those who see many beautiful things but not true beauty itself, nor yet are able to follow another person leading them towards that actual beauty; again, who see many just deeds but not true justice, and treat all other phenomena in the same way—these then we say have opinions of all things, but know none of the things of which they form their opinions ( $\delta\omicron\xi\acute{\alpha}\zeta\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota$ ).' Plato continues in 480: 'Do we not recall that we said that these men love and admire beautiful sounds and colours and such like, but do not accept the existence of absolute beauty? We remember. Surely then we would not be inconsistent in calling them philodoxers rather than philosophers?'

To make sense of these implications we need to see Sun, Line, and Cave integrated in an educational theory, as at the bottom of p. 89. While it is true

<sup>1</sup> R. L. Nettleship, op. cit. 218.

<sup>2</sup> Ad. Tanqueray: *Synopsis Theologiae*

*Dogmaticae* (Rome, 1913), i, *de uno Deo*, Cap. II, Art. II, pp. 264-6 (tom. 2).

that the shadow of a man can be suggested by the shadow of a tree and thus *εἰκασία* may arise about the matter, which only experience and induction can finally replace by an *ὀρθή δόξα* about the source of the shadow, leading to *πίστις* or belief in the reality of the object projecting it, it is still more true that much reading of Homer will convince a young man that the world of sense and a life of action alone represent reality. His musing on the poet (*εἰκασία*) creates in him an opinion intermediate between truth and falsehood (*δόξα*) leading to an unquestioning acceptance (*πίστις*) regarding the world of sense around him. Homeric education promotes philodoxy, which means *love of a condition between ignorance and knowledge*. Therefore a *φιλόδοξος* is one in this state of mind, and Ast in his *Lexicon Platonicum* is completely wrong in rendering the word as meaning *gloriae cupidus* in this context, whatever may be its appropriate sense in Polybius.

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